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ABSTRACT 
The ‘region’ and ‘regional change’ have been elusive ideas within political and 
economic geography, and in essence require a greater understanding of their 
dynamic characteristics. Trailing in the backwaters of the devolution to the 
Celtic nations of Britain, the contemporary era of New Labour’s political-
economic ideology, manifest through ‘third-way’ governance in England 
places the region and its functional capacity into the heart of geographical 
inquiry. Drawing upon a new regionalist epistemology, this paper seeks to 
recover a sense of (regional) political economy through a critical investigation 
of the development and formulation of Blair’s “New Regional Policy” (NRP). I 
address how New Labour has attempted to marry economic regionalisation on 
the one hand, and democratic regionalism on the other. This paper 
specifically questions the wisdom of such a marriage of politically distinct 
ideologies through a critical investigation of the underlying contradictions of 
their strategy from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint. Demonstrated 
both in the North East no vote in 2004, and in the post-mortem undertaken by 
the ODPM Select Committee in 2005, the paper illustrates how a loss of 
political drive gradually undermined the capacity of devolution to deliver in 
England. Finally, I argue that through the lens of the NRP we can speculate 
on some of the wider issues and implications for the study of regional 
governance. 
KEY WORDS  New Regional Political Economy; Economic 
Regionalisation; Democratic Regionalism; England; New Labour 
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THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF BLAIR’S “NEW 
REGIONAL POLICY” 
 
 
“Offer[ing] a sympathetic review of certain institutionalist perspectives 
currently at the vanguard of economic geographical discourse and urban - 
regional inquiry… the approaches are beset by several conceptual 
deficiencies and sources of potential confusion. These include… a thin 
political economy most conspicuous in the failure to appreciate fully the critical 
role of the state in shaping the urban - regional fabric and a related weakness 
in examining the asymmetries of power which enframe the governance of 
space economies.” 
MacLeod (2001a: 1146, emphasis added) 
 
1. Introduction: from New Regionalism to New Regional Political 
Economy 
Shortly after New Labour’s landslide sweep to power in 1997, a 
comprehensive programme of constitutional modernisation was set in motion 
throughout Great Britain, which resulted in the creation of an elected 
Parliament for Scotland, a National Assembly for Wales, an Assembly for 
Northern Ireland, an elected London Mayor to lead a newly formed Greater 
London Assembly, and a working partnership of Regional Development 
Agencies and Regional Chambers in each of the eight English regions. For 
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and London, the restructuring of their state 
institutions to install the new mechanisms of governance that would enable 
them to engage fully in devolved politics was relatively straightforward. 
However, in England: 
 
“Striking images of people celebrating the birth of their new democratic 
institutions in Cardiff and Edinburgh reaffirmed the view that the way in 
which we ‘do’ politics in the UK was changed forever…[However] the 
English have had little chance to celebrate. The governance of England 
represents a gaping hole at the centre of the Government’s devolution 
programme.”  
Tomaney and Mitchell (1999: 2) 
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By the end of Labour’s first term (2001), England remained the only 
country in the United Kingdom to not be in receipt of additional elected 
political representation; but it appeared that the progressive nature of its 
institutional restructuring at the regional scale was moving inevitably towards 
addressing this imbalance. Between 2001-2003, with the momentum of Blair’s 
‘New Regional Policy’ (NRP) gathering pace in England, in early July 2004 the 
governments Regions Minister Nick Raynsford announced that in three 
English regions – the North East, North West, and Yorkshire & the Humber – 
referenda were to be held, offering the people of the north the opportunity to 
support the creation of Elected Regional Assemblies (ERA). However, by late 
July the referenda in the North West and Yorkshire & the Humber had been 
dramatically postponed by the government, while in the North East 
campaigning began in earnest. Outlined in both the Regional White Paper 
Your Region, Your Choice (DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002) and the Regional 
Assemblies Bill (ODPM, 2004), the people of the North East were presented 
with what the government described at the opportunity to set in motion their 
proposals to create an ERA for the region which “will allow the region to truly 
take control of its own destiny and enable it to move up the economic and 
social prosperity ladder”. Where the existing arrangements of RDAs and 
Regional Chambers had their roots firmly entrenched within the contradictions 
exposed in past waves of regional policy, the referendum on whether to 
create an ERA for the North East region provided the opportunity for two new 
breaks from traditional regional policy discourse: (i) top-down economic 
regionalisation no longer had to run parallel and distanciated from bottom-up 
democratic regionalism; and (ii) all regions did not have to be treat alike, but 
individual regions could make an individual choice – through a referendum.  
On 4th November 2004, however, traditional regionalised policy in 
England was reinforced when the North East electorate – to whom an ERA 
was designed to offer “a distinct political voice and a real say over decisions 
which matter to them” (Prescott, quoted in DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002: 
foreword) – voted emphatically against the proposals (78% against) to enable 
the “twin-tracks” (Jeffery and Mawson, 2002) of economic regionalisation and 
democratic regionalism to be aligned more strategically. This statement of 
discontent with the government proposals by the North East electorate 
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marked a dramatic end to the ‘new’ in Blair’s NRP, and once more highlighted 
a series of important political-economic tensions in the way that academics 
understand the geography of regions, and how policymakers interpret this in 
the formulation of regional policy. Labour’s determination (in principle) to 
devolve political and institutional capacities through a progressive programme 
of constitutional reform coalesced around (i) a desire to remedy a party 
political legacy of past failures to implement devolution; (ii) to align Britain 
more closely with its continental European neighbours; and, (iii) to seek 
greater engagement with a populist belief that had been spreading throughout 
Western Europe and North America in the mid-1990s known as the ‘new 
regionalism’. The latter of these three themes raises critical questions about 
the emergence of the NRP, and it is this, which I want to develop here. 
Aligning itself most prominently with a neo-Marxian institutionalised 
political-economic approach (Amin, 2001; Jessop, 2001), the new regionalism 
broadly claims that contemporary capitalism and its territorial configuration are 
best regulated and governed in and through the decentralisation of socio-
economic decision-making and associated policy implementation to 
subnational institutional frameworks and supports. The dominant strand 
constituting the new regionalism coalesces under the banner of economic 
geography, and argues that the region is establishing itself as the scale where 
knowledge creation, learning, enterprise, and innovation which are believed to 
be critical to economic development in the contemporary era of capitalism are 
coalescing (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Florida, 1995; Storper, 1997; Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998). This strand of the new regionalism elicits the claim that there 
is an economic dividend to be gained from harnessing and developing new 
structures of economic governance at the regional level. 
The alternative approach is based in political science and advocates 
the adoption of a ‘progressive’ new regionalism (Keating, 1997; 1998). This 
can be seen through three interrelated processes which appear to be 
challenging the authority of the nation state and constitute the arguments of 
progressive new regionalism: (i) there is a loss of power upwards through the 
processes of Europeanisation; (ii) there is a loss of power downwards through 
the growth of regional territorial identity, politics of assertion, and policies of 
devolution; and, (iii) there is a loss of power outwards through globalisation 
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and market forces. Theories of devolution, therefore, tend to range from those 
which stress its economic value (which are predominantly new regionalist 
approaches) against those political science theories of multi-level governance 
which stress the intrinsic value of regional governance as good governance 
by providing decision-making as close to the governed as possible given the 
policy domain context. 
Jointly under the banner of the ‘new regionalism’ (Amin, 1999) and 
‘regional political economy’ (Agnew, 2000; MacLeod, 2000) they have given 
rise to a plethora of accounts of the economic resurgence of regions within an 
increasingly globalised arena. In short, consensus states that theoretically 
regions can dualistically induce both a democratic dividend as well as the 
aforementioned economic dividend, and that the regional scale offers “both a 
convincing theoretical explanation of recent and future regional economic 
development and also the best approach to policy formation” (Lovering, 1999: 
380; see also, Harrison, 2006).  
Critically, the implications of such assertions lead policymakers, 
academics, and strategists to ask a key question: can regional structures of 
governance provide the capacity for actors to develop more appropriate 
economic models than national government whilst retaining/strengthening 
lines of democratic accountability? I want to begin to explore this question by 
drawing on the work of Gordon MacLeod (2001a) who has recently criticised 
academics engaged in this debate for the wholesale engagement with ‘thin 
political economy’ readings of the institutionalised landscape of reflexive 
capitalism 
Responding to Amin and Thrift’s (2000) polemic on the 
reconceptualising of economic geography (to include a more heterodox, 
socially and culturally based ‘economic knowledges’) Martin and Sunley 
(2001) have highlighted how a ‘recovery of a sense of political economy’ is 
one of the most urgent agendas to be addressed by human geographers at 
this time. Moving away from the classical Marxist era, economic geography 
has progressively distanced itself from the role of power and politics in 
moulding the space economy. However, the focus upon the geographies of 
the socioinstitutional frameworks in regional economies (predominately 
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successful regions) has led to a neglect of political questions regarding 
inequality, distribution and representation.  
 It seems that approaches to political economy within the loose bounds 
of human geography are indeed held together by an underlying sentiment that 
the political and the economic are inextricably and irrevocably two sides of the 
same explanatory coin. It is important, therefore, that we must seek to recover 
understandings of the ‘political economy’ approach that stress the important 
interrelationships that exist between economic, social, and political processes 
operating as ‘moving parts’ habitually colliding both spatially and temporally.  
 Simultaneously arguing against the dangers of a tautological ‘soft 
institutionalism’, MacLeod (2001a) offers a sympathetic critique aimed at 
redirecting, rather than making redundant, some of the most pressing aspects 
of the new institutionalism through a deeper engagement with the regulation 
approach. Largely in agreement with MacLeod’s assertion, this paper offers 
an alternative empirics-based approach in order to inject a degree of 
‘grounded thick political economy’ into the work of new regionalists. Whereas 
MacLeod’s agenda profited from the championing of a theoretical proposition 
through the promotion of regulation theory, I argue that we need to blend 
empirical and theoretical propositions to take forward what I would like to call 
‘New Regional Political Economy’. In order to explore this, and to provide a 
more grounded thick approach to political economy, this paper weaves a 
reinvigorated political economic reading of the state interventionism of Blair’s 
New Labour government through their programme of constitutional change 
and devolution occurring within Britain. Empirically, this constitutional 
programme is supportive of the theoretical approach adopted by MacLeod 
(2001b) of looking at the state-centred political-economic approach to the 
institutionalisation of regions. Moreover, this paper illustrates how the 
empirical evidence gained from the NRP can be seen to support MacLeod’s 
(2001a) assertion that thin political-economy readings simultaneously fail to 
fully appreciate (i) the critical role of the state; and (ii) the asymmetries of 
power.  
Through an in-depth historiography of regional policy within England, 
Section 2 develops a narrative, which (i) draws on the important distinction 
between economic regionalisation and democratic regionalism; and, (ii) 
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illustrates how many of the components of the NRP were not wholly ‘new’, but 
remodelled versions of previous policies. Developing this theme further I 
unravel how in the early years of government (1997-2001), the NRP was 
implemented along lines which were consistent with historical discourse. 
Illustrated through the creation of RDAs, Section 3 gauges whether Labour’s 
politically motivated economic regionalisation of government policy has 
changed the ability of actors to harness an economic dividend in the English 
regions. Relatedly, through the establishment of Regional Chambers as 
shadowing bodies to the RDAs, Section 4 assesses whether the new regional 
institutions in the English regions have changed the ability of governance 
structures to engage an increasingly apathetic electorate through new forms 
of civic engagement and democratic renewal. This paper concludes by 
drawing together the empirical material presented in the paper to show (i) how 
the Labour governments proposals for ERA failed to understand and learn 
from the contradictions that were present in the operation of RDAs; (ii) that to 
articulate the problems faced by RDAs, you need to appreciate the history of 
regional policy in England; and (iii) that regional policy in England has 
adopted a thin political-economy approach to understanding the critical role of 
the state and in examining the asymmetries of power. In thinking about all 
this, I offer reflections on both the state in theory and the state in practice. 
 
2 Territory, Power, and the English Dimensioni 
 Regionalist ideologies and movements have agreed on the necessity 
for decentralising power from a time-honoured and antiquated London centric 
model in principle throughout the duration of the twentieth century (Tomaney, 
2000; Amin et al., 2003; Lyons, 2004). Neville Johnson (1983: 6) surmises 
how a relatively stable set of propositions has characterised the general 
principles of decentralisation: (i) the concentration of power at the centre in 
the British system of government is harmful and should be reversed; (ii) the 
practices of government are insufficiently democratic, in particular the extent 
of citizen participation; and, (iii) the rate of economic development has been 
inadequate and unequally distributed. Taking this forward, this section traces 
the origins of regional policy in England and argues that we have seen the 
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emergence of a twin-track approach (Jeffery and Mawson, 2002) with 
important links to previous rounds of political intervention. 
 Before 1916, the London Westminster Parliaments was involved in 
evolving from being a colonial centre to a national parliament. At the forefront 
of this transition was the seriously discussed ‘Home Rule for All’; namely that 
the colonies, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, be given home rule, and 
Westminster would become a federal parliament; within which, England would 
then have to be regionalised to avoid it dominating the federation. That a 
federal approach was never adopted is interesting because it reinforces the 
colonial relationship between London and the regions.  
Following on from this, the period 1916-1944 was characterised by the 
problematisation of the English regions. As such, World War I marked the 
establishment of the first regional structures in England, when a number of 
regional offices for Government departments were created in order to regulate 
food supplies and labour distribution. Coinciding with these practical 
necessities and the calls for Home Rule in Ireland, two initial devolution 
schemes were proposed which both treat England as a single entity rather 
than as a sub-national jigsaw of regional pieces (Mawson, 1997).  
 The inter-war years saw hostility to the overwhelming role played out 
by the city of London in British society, and famously led Sir Patrick Geddes to 
commission C.B. Fawcett to elaborate on an earlier piece he had written 
(Fawcett, 1917), which supported his call that the politics of the day was 
inescapably premised on tensions between “centralised government – and 
civic regionalism” (1919, quoted in Defries, 1927: 238). This statement has 
subsequently become ingrained into the evolution of the Labour Party 
throughout the duration of the twentieth century and, furthermore, it lies at the 
heart of Blair’s NRP. Centralisers in the Labour Party have historically 
implored top-down Fabian socialism as was the case in the 1950s where 
services, most notably associated with the National Health Service, were 
provided by the centre. Adopting the language of Cooke and Morgan (1998), 
this first wave of regionalism can be conceptualised as the state-centred 
repertoire, characterised by the use of ‘functional regions’ and the theory of 
‘spatial Keynesianism’ (Martin and Sunley, 1997). Regional policies were 
simple variants of a broader set of political initiatives that derived from the 
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interventionist Keynesian state that drew its political support from the 
disprorportionally high levels of unemployment that had scarred the country in 
the inter-war years.  
 In creating eight Regional Economic Planning Boards (REPBs) under 
the 1960’s Wilson government, paradoxically these represented ‘top-down’ 
approaches to the mobilisation of regional economies in their guise as 
centrally controlled institutions. Based upon French-style ‘indicative’ planning, 
they were wholly reliant on central government, were devoid of executive 
powers and were administered by civil servants working out of the centre. 
REPBs are important because they provide an illustration of how the political 
legitimacy and powers awarded to subnational institutions are fought over in 
processes of decentralisation. Devolution revolves centrally around the 
dualistic notion that all other things being equal, national government will 
strive to devolve administrative responsibility to the subnational tier whilst 
limiting to a minimum the resources attached (Rodríguéz-Pose and Gill, 
2003). This historical example of the REPBs highlighted how despite the 
name, they were kept national by a dominant centralist government, and 
moreover, the Department of Economic Affairs singularly failed to offer any 
resources to implement the REPBs proposals (Smith, 1965). 
The emergence of the NRP can be traced through the ideological 
beliefs held by the leading proponents of the Alternative Regional Strategy 
(ARS) (Parliamentary Spokesman’s Working Group, 1982) who stood in the 
‘localiser’ camp. They held the belief that previous plans were unsustainable, 
and sought to look at why these distortions happen. Written during the first 
term of Thatcherism, and thus stood in opposition to the prevailing trends in 
political-economic policy, the group claimed that socioeconomic distortions 
resulted from the complete absence of any regional strategy, or economic 
devolution to England (Miller and Mawson, 1986). Despite political claims that 
any attempt to afford development agencies to England would be deemed “a 
rather amateurish approach to a very sophisticated game” (Hansard, 1976) 
the then Shadow Regional Affairs Spokesman, John Prescott, remained 
convinced of their capabilities. Drawing heavily on his own historical and 
personal accounts of the failed planning boards of the 1960s, Prescott’s team 
was purposive in wanting to establish an administrative socioeconomic 
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infrastructure in line with that which had been afforded to the Scots and the 
Welsh in the 1970s. Turning political ideology on its head, this new [regional] 
political game was played out against a new backdrop that privileged the 
market over the state. Deploying the language of Cooke and Morgan once 
again, this second wave of neoclassical political-economic beliefs was based 
upon a ‘neo-liberal repertoire’ as characterised by the policies adopted under 
the banner of Thatcherism. 
The so-called birth of a ‘New’ Labour Party in the mid-1990s can be 
seen as the archetypal embracing of a third political ideology (the 
‘associational repertoire’). This new approach does not seek to privilege either 
the state or the market, but aspires to empower the intermediate associations 
that lie between these bi-polar extremities. Adopting an intermediary position 
juxtaposed between the classical state-centred and neo-liberal repertoires 
privileging of the state and the market respectively, the key here is not the 
scale of intervention per se but the mode of intervention (Cooke and Morgan, 
1998). What is critical for the basis of this paper is establishing that regional 
policy cannot be detached from the broader political-economic ideology in 
which it is positioned. Thus, by 1997, English devolution had become firmly 
entrenched as a question of economic governance rather than democratic 
realisation (see Tomaney, 2005; Jones et al. 2005). What this section has so 
far highlighted is that New Labour’s programme of devolution and 
constitutional change must be viewed within the wider context of beliefs 
surrounding the structuring of governance. Although the state retains its 
unique institutional status responsible for social cohesion and the integrity of 
the national system of innovation, the associational repertoire requires two 
institutional innovations: (i) the devolution of power within the state system to 
better placed subnational tiers; and, (ii) the delegation of certain tasks to 
business-led associations with greater knowledge and credibility that a state 
agency (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). It is against this broader political-
economic backdrop characteristically known as the ‘third-way’ that New 
Labour’s policies of decentralisation must be framed. The paper now 
considers the territorial form of their political strategy. 
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2.1 New Labour, New Regionalists 
Whilst in political opposition to the Conservative administration, 
ambitious proposals were put forward to embark upon a programme of wide 
reaching constitutional reform “reversing the tide of centralisation and giving 
regions and the people who live in them more power to determine their own 
future” (Prescott, 1996, quoted in John et al., 2002: 734). These proposals 
were designed not only to incubate economic development, but also to 
appease the strong regionalist lobby in the northern regions through 
simultaneously adopting an approach to decentralisation, bringing policies 
closer to the people and rebuilding accountability through two independent 
‘tracks’ that have run side-by-side (see Jeffery and Mawson, 2002). 
 
Road 1 – Straw’s Regional Democracy: Jack Straw (then Shadow Home 
Secretary) believed a dualistic approach to developing a structural presence 
at the regional level could provide the solution to Blair’s problem of how 
English regionalism could sit neatly alongside the broader commitments 
towards Celtic devolution: (i) the formation of Regional Chambers was 
presented as the means of formalising the plethora of pre-existing groupings 
already operating within the regions; and, (ii) the second step would lead, in 
the future, to the establishment of directly elected regional assemblies in 
those regions where public demand is evident (Labour Party, 1995). 
Subsequently, A New Voice for England’s Regions (Labour Party, 1996) 
reiterated their commitment by expanding its horizons to outline some of the 
linkages and hurdles that lay between the two proposed phasesii. At the crux 
of Straw’s proposals, however, lay the Conservative claim that regional 
government would actually create more bureaucracy (Curry, 1995; see also, 
Straw, 1995; Whitehead, 1996). Straw’s incipient foray outlining proposals for 
a new approach to English regionalism centred on democratic accountability 
through the medium of democratic regionalism. 
 
Road 2 – Prescott’s Regional Economics: The committed regionalist John 
Prescott moved swiftly in light of Straw’s democratic proposals to advance the 
English regionalism in its economic sense through RDAs. Mediated though 
the publication of the hard-hitting ‘Millan Report’ (RPC, 1996), Prescott’s 
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economic model was unswerving in its desire to promote economic 
regionalisation with its slogans of increased ‘competitiveness’, ‘growth’, and 
‘sustainability’. Renewing the Regions (RPC, 1996) proposed that every 
region should have ‘one-stop’ RDAs promoting economic development within 
an accountable framework.  
 
 In the process of ridding the angst of Thatcherite conservatism from the 
political map, Blair’s New Labour set about realigning the government 
machine towards its proposed institutional framework for the English regions 
(Russell and Hazell, 2000). Shortly after coming to power, it was seen that 
Prescott’s regional economics had won a moral battle when the new 
government became increasingly concerned about how tenable Straw’s 
regional democratic ideals were in practiceiii. Mirroring the REPBs of the 
1960s, the RDAs were born out of a new superministry – on this occasion, a 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). 
Assigned as Secretary of State at the DETR, Prescott was able to ‘invent his 
own ministry’ that would allow “a significant part [to] be played by 
decentralisation, enabling the English regions through regional development 
agencies and regional chambers to set local priorities” (Anderson and Mann, 
1997: 148). 
 A little after six months at the helm, the Prescott-Caborn axis started 
what became a politically single-minded campaign towards effectual 
implementation of a decentralised system of economic governance for 
England and its regions. Initially contained within the Building Partnerships for 
Prosperity White Paper (DETR, 1997b), the proposals heralded the 
establishment of ‘new structures and opportunities’ in and through which the 
English regions can ‘punch their weight in the global market place’ (DETR, 
1997a: 1). Moreover, I would argue that the experiences of the RDA provide 
the most comprehensive and mature account of how Labours politically 
motivated economic reorganisation of government policy has sought to 
change the ability of actors to harness an economic dividend in the English 
regions. It is the experiences of the RDAs that the paper now turns to in order 
to highlight (i) how their roots are firmly entrenched in the contradictions 
exposed in the past waves of regional policy outlined above; and (ii) how they 
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empirically support MacLeod’s notion of ‘thin political economy’ approaches to 
regional policy implementation in action through a failure to appreciate the 
critical role of the state and the asymmetries of power. Critically, in this 
section I will also begin to illustrate how the contradictions and asymmetrical 
nature of RDAs lays the foundation for understanding why the ERA project 
was inevitably lacking in thick political-economy. Blending ‘grounded’ empirics 
with theoretical propositions, the NRP narrative takes forward my argument 
for engaging with new regional political economy. 
 
3. Regional Development Agencies: ‘Economic Powerhouses’? 
 
“RDAs are not just important because the ‘third way’ or ‘supply-side 
socialist’ political spin of New Labour says so. These policies and their 
discourses are clearly indicative of the new regionalist orthodoxy in 
action”  
Jones (2001: 1194, emphasis original) 
 
The RDA project endeavours to advance all English regions’ assets 
securely onto a globally competitive playing field. From the outset, this 
assumption neglects the political-economic imperative of paying due attention 
to the complex connectivity of economic, political, and cultural factors that are 
required to mobilise a region. As Jones (2001: 1196) has argued, practising 
this political-economic philosophy of ‘talking-up’ scale whilst neglecting to 
“unpack the multifarious construction of territorially defined collective entities 
(such as regions)” adds weight to the interesting analogy used by Lovering 
(1999: 390) that the new regionalism is a “policy tail wagging the analytical 
dog”. Jones goes onto square the circle on this argument when he makes the 
critical acknowledgement that if this political mantra is central to the NRP then 
it is ‘doubly misleading’ because it then assumes that structures of regional 
governance can in theory intervene in the economy, smooth over its 
contradictions, and ensure economic growth. However, it would be unfair to 
level this at the feet of the RDAs who have been largely defenceless to any 
macro-economic restructuring that has occurred within the English regions 
(Tomaney and Hetherington, 2000; see also Amin, 2001; Lovering, 1999). 
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 With the overriding belief that the RDAs would be seen as part of a 
wider programme aimed at redressing the structural weakness of the UK 
economy, the policymakers have taken for granted the importance of higher-
level state intervention at the national level. Furthermore, the erosion of 
national fiscal support has left regions open to intensified inter-spatial 
competition and a necessity to engage in trial-and-error experiments, which 
Jessop (2002: 159) argues “promotes uneven development rather than 
compensates for it”. Critically, if these aforementioned theoretical concerns 
are in fact realities, then we must view the NRP as being constructed upon 
rather shaky foundations. 
 
3.1 Muddles, Shortfalls, and Discrepancies: a perceived reality  
In order to gauge whether New Labour’s politically motivated economic 
regionalisation of government policy has changed the ability of actors to 
harness an economic dividend in the English regions, it is necessary to 
explore three key tensions that have emerged with the deployment of RDAs. 
Firstly, the NRPs privileging of economic regionalisation over democratic 
regionalism has meant that despite some tinkering at the edges, RDAs have 
retained their unilateral economic focus: 
 
“What we are doing in this exercise is addressing the economic 
deficit…There are structural weaknesses within the competitive wealth-
creating base of the English regions that have to be addressed – on 
that there is, I think, absolute unanimity. Wealth creation is the bottom 
line.”  
Richard Caborn, quoted in Financial Times (1998: 2) 
 
This tension was more than simply the outcome a bureaucratic 
‘muddle’, the conflated appearance of the RDAs was the direct result of a 
clear dichotomy of beliefs running through the Labour hierarchy. The majority 
view of ‘regional sceptics’ headed by the axis of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown 
hailed the RDAs as simply an important innovation in their overall political-
economic strategy. As Rentoul (1996: 467) reveals, there was no foresight 
(so-to-speak) of a greater regional agenda lying in wait: “in England, [Blair] 
does not expect devolution to go beyond regional development agencies”.  
Citation: HARRISON, J., 2006. The political-economy of Blair’s “New Regional Policy.” Geoforum, 37 (6), pp. 932-943
 15
The minority view held together by the committed regionalist axis of 
Prescott-Caborn at the DETR hailed the RDAs as an important innovation that 
marked the first piece in a much larger regional jigsaw that had still to be 
unravellediv and led to what was a systematic attempt to forcibly assign things 
that happen to be in the remit of different ministries towards the RDA as if 
they were precursors of something grander. Interestingly though, both views 
had striking similarities with REPBs of the 1960s in that this has led the NRP 
towards central government domination though state provided structures, 
national targeting of RDAs, national remits and national politics operating out 
of rather than for the regions. Put more unkindly, RDAs represent a form of 
political economic responsibility without appropriate levels of power implying 
that England’s attempt at decentralisation has been politically and 
economically ‘thin’ (MacLeod, 2001a; Morgan, 2002). 
Secondly, England’s particular take on the new regionalism has a 
philosophical implication that all regions can be winners (Caborn, 1996) 
through the advancement of regional structures of governance, but this 
appears on the surface to do little to address the unique problems occurring in 
individually unique regions (Harrison, 2006). Retorting claims that there is an 
economic divide existing within England (Cabinet Office, 1999a), the evidence 
suggests that Blair’s policies have done little to support his advocacy that 
interregional divisions don’t exist. With the belief that regional economic 
failure was “turning Britain into a nation of regional have’s and regional have 
not’s” (Caborn, 1996; DTI, 2000), RDAs were exalted as the primary 
mechanism for addressing these concerns. The suggestion is that far from 
levelling the playing field for the English regions, the failure to incorporate 
macroeconomic issues has only served to accentuate the regional economic 
chasmv. Whereas previous rounds of regional policy in England have been 
designed to regulate capital movements and redistribute resources through 
state policy interventionism (see Parsons, 1988), the RDAs have provided 
evidence of a reversal in this approach.  
Finally, by failing to resolve the fundamental structural weaknesses of 
the national economy, RDAs offer an illustrative case of what Philo and Parr 
(2000) have recently termed ‘fragile institutional accomplishments’. Far from 
building up the social capital and associationalism that the rhetoric of the new 
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regionalism promotes, the RDAs are simply enacting the role of rescaling 
political and economic activities (Jones and MacLeod, 1999). In this sense, 
the growing chasm between the rhetoric and reality of the RDA project 
highlights how England’s new regionalism serves to reiterate the 
government’s ensuring of continued national state power at the centre – as 
was also characteristic of the 1960s and REPBs. In particular, the RDAs role 
as the economic flagship has been greatly exaggerated as the Deputy-
General of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) derogatorily put it: 
 
“Business thought it was promised a lion but the initial reality was 
closer to a mouse.” 
John Cridland, quoted in Tomaney et al. (2001) 
 
However, having survived a close and critical examination of their 
capacities, the RDAs have showed that they can play an important role as 
economic catalysts within the English regions. Moreover, they need to 
encourage partners in their quest to create transitional learning regions for the 
21st Century and must be prepared to commit to becoming genuine learning 
RDAs, prepared to experiment, to debate their corner, and not afraid to take 
risks (Shutt, 2000). In this scenario, rather than proclaiming the RDAs being in 
the vanguard as “economic powerhouses for sustainable growth” 
(DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002: 5) for the regions, they would be more aptly 
suited to acting as regional ‘instigators’/‘incubators’ of indigenous growth 
clusters. The RDA model is ostensibly built to deal with small-scale projects, 
but it has found itself working on projects over and above their station. 
Furthermore, it has been undeniable that their deployment has led to deep-
rooted concerns regarding the supplementing of the already heavily burdened 
democratic deficit in the English regions. 
 
4. Decentralisation, Democratisation and Rationalisation 
 
“What we need are policies which empower communities so they can 
determine their own future…A new regional policy which offers 
flexibility and local ownership, and which actively promotes partnership 
working and ‘joined-up’ policies, must be a priority for Labour.” 
Richard Caborn (2000) 
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With the limited accountability of RDAs, the Labour government moved 
swiftly in its attempts to inject a degree of associational democracy in the 
English regions through the simultaneous creation of new ‘shadow’ bodies 
known as Regional Chambersvi. An addition to the democratic deficit was not 
what Labour preached, but the RDA experiment provided the new Labour 
government with a major political headache. Having observed the internal 
crisis that struck the Welsh Development Agency (WDA) in the early 1990s, 
policymakers concluded that it was not enough for economic driven agencies 
to operate in a region, but that they also needed to be of that region (Morgan, 
1999). As non-departmental public bodies, the RDAs themselves are 
accountable upwards to Whitehall, but fail to adequately “meet the exacting 
standard of being fully accountable downwards to their regions” (ibid., 665). 
RDAs exhibit the problems of progressive new regionalism being an ‘uneasy 
halfway house’ caught in the middle between these vertical tracks of 
accountability (Harding et al., 1999).  
 The initial skirmishes with issues surrounding democracy have 
ostensibly taken a back-seat role to the economic concerns in the NRP, which 
is wholly consistent with historical regional policy (see section 2). From 
discussions thus far, I believe that the government has become embroiled in a 
multiscalar economic and democratic conundrum whereby the mixing of 
academic ideology and policy initiatives, juxtaposed alongside the institutional 
restructuring inherent with the modernisation of government, is increasingly 
leaving the NRP distanciated from new regionalist orthodoxy. On the one 
hand, this growing chasm between the rhetoric outlined in the new 
regionalism and the reality of the measures being deployed on the ground is 
ostensibly the result of the state. On the other hand, and contrary to 
advancing the notions of civic engagement and strategic partnership working 
for the purposes of instilling trust across regional partners, there is a huge 
asymmetry of in power because the NRP has found itself implementing these 
democratic ideals solely to enable the state to justify their policy of economic 
regionalisation. 
 
4.1 Towards a Solution: Towards a Regional Renaissance? 
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Through the publication of the Regional White Paper Your Region, 
Your Choice  (DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002) Prescott’s ‘radical agenda’ placed 
the NRP at the cusp of breaking with the traditional discourse of regional 
policy by providing for the first time a skeleton model which brought together 
economic regionalisation with democratic regionalism. According to the White 
Paper: 
 
“In many respects the two go hand in hand: the Government believes 
that greater accountability will itself lead to a more effective decision-
making process. In turn, giving an elected assembly the strategic lead 
on regional issues will help to improve regional performance.” 
DTLR/Cabinet Office (2002: Para. 3.4) 
 
To achieve this dream, Prescott was only too aware though that he 
needed to convince the sceptical regionalists Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and 
Stephen Byers, to commit to his proposals by relinquishing some of their 
centrally-based powers and resources in order to put some flesh on the 
proposals. In order to achieve this the NRP had to remodel itself to fit in with 
higher-level policy strands such as government modernisation (Cabinet 
Office, 1999b), service delivery (HM Treasury, 2001), and local government 
reorganisation (DETR, 2000). This process was also aided by shifting 
opinions in Whitehall that saw a number of key government figures 
repositioning themselves and providing a genuine consolidation of national 
political and fiscal support to the NRP as can be seen with the statements 
emanating from HM Treasury and the Department for Trade and Industry at 
this time: 
 
“We are moving away from the old Britain of subjects where people 
had to look upwards to a Whitehall bureaucracy for their solutions – to 
a Britain of citizens where region to region, locality to locality we are 
ourselves in charge and where it is up to us.” 
Chancellor of the Exchequer - Gordon Brown (2001) 
 
“The economic differences between UK regions are clear and indicate 
that a winners’ circle is emerging, with some regions keeping up and 
staying in touch while other slip behind. These are the underlying 
causes we need to tackle through a strong, radically reformed regional 
policy, simply tinkering at the edges will not be enough.” 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry - Stephen Byers (DTI, 2000) 
Citation: HARRISON, J., 2006. The political-economy of Blair’s “New Regional Policy.” Geoforum, 37 (6), pp. 932-943
 19
 
 Interestingly, this shifting of previously sceptical regionalists in the 
upper echelons of the Labour government (such as Gordon Brown and 
Stephen Byers) towards developing policies with a regional emphasis to them 
did bring some interesting debates to the surface regarding the role of the 
state (see Morgan, 2001) but many commentators believed that for the NRP 
to proceed as planned that this was simply a measure of its success to date. 
 Early in Labour’s second term (which extended between 2001-2005) 
and with the NRPs momentum gathering pace a window of opportunity was 
presented to the three northern regions of Englandvii to push forward with 
referendum to decide whether the people wanted an Elected Regional 
Assembly (ERA). The ERA proposals marked a landmark opportunity which 
broke with the historical tradition of regional policy and provided the ‘new’ in 
Blair’s NRP. Where the RDA/Regional Chamber project retained strong links 
with previous waves of regional policy in England, the ERA referendums were 
designed provided two important differences to those key tensions identified 
within the RDA project (see Section 3.1)(i) economic regionalisation no longer 
had to run parallel and distanciated from democratic regionalism, but could be 
merged together to make a coherent regional policy; and, (ii) all regions did 
not have to be treat alike, but individual regions could make an individual 
choice. This significant shift in the narrative of the NRP appears of the surface 
to address important weaknesses that had existed in regional policy for 
generations. However, on the third key tension identified earlier in the paper – 
the chasm between policy rhetoric and political reality – remained as wide and 
as problematic as ever within regional policy. On 4th November 2004 this was 
born out when the electorate of the North East voted emphatically against the 
proposals and in effect marked an end to the ‘new’ in Blair’s NRP. In 
explaining their defeat, the leader of the Yes4theNorthEast campaign has 
focused on this chasm within the proposals: 
 
“I think the weakness of the offer probably played a part but I think 
there are other issues. The proposal to create a regional assembly was 
quite a complex idea and we failed to demonstrate how it would benefit 
people as individuals. It was a difficult task made more difficult by the 
limited powers which people perceived to be on offer. We were 
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promising them jam tomorrow as the powers weren’t strong but we 
hoped they would grow in time.” 
Professor John Tomaney (quoted in Kearney and Jenkins, 2004) 
 
In the final section of the paper I want to expand this further by arguing 
that while the ERA proposals managed to negotiate two of the contradictions 
of RDAs (and regional policy historically), the underlying rationale for its 
rejection by the electorate was the states failure to eradicate the asymmetrical 
nature of the powers that were to be devolved to the new institutions, because 
while some powers were pushed towards the region other powers were being 
drawn back into the centre. 
 
5 Thin Political Economy: NRPs fatal mistake 
 As I have mentioned earlier, Your Region, Your Choice marked a 
watershed in the development of the NRP as it outlined proposals for a fuller 
engagement with the ideological manta of the new regionalism that there was 
an economic and democratic dividend to be had through the decentralisation 
of socio-economic decision-making and associated policymaking to 
subnational institutional frameworks and supports. However, the purity of 
these new regionalist ideas were becoming increasingly enmeshed and 
hidden in a complex web of entangled policy hierarchies as the state 
realigned itself towards the English regions. As I highlighted earlier, the NRPs 
emergence under the guiding hand of John Prescott at the DETR, provided a 
clear understanding of the purpose of the proposed new regional institutions. 
Interestingly, the watershed that Your Region, Your Choice actually marked in 
the development of the NRP was the entanglement of its previously clear 
purposes and an obtrusive complexity that read more like a party manifesto 
than a Regional White Paper. To give just one example, the price paid by the 
NRP for bringing HM Treasury on board was (i) a commitment to some 
centralist targeting for extra funding; (ii) a backtracking on all previous 
statements regarding an ERAs ability to raise tax and have legislative powers; 
and (iii) the imposition of the regional institutions into Labour’s control-
conscious and heavily-centralised Comprehensive Spending Reviews and 
Public Service Agreements. While many saw the critical mass of new support 
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from key state leaders (such as Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Stephen 
Byers) as a measure of the NRPs success, the underlying reality was that it 
was paradoxically bringing the whole process to its knees.  
While the ERA proposals managed to negotiate two of the 
contradictions that have blighted the RDAs (and regional policy historically), 
the increasing role of the central state institutions in the development of the 
NRP gave them a bulging and overburdening portfolio of policy 
responsibilities without any appropriate powers and resources to make them 
equitable. Furthermore, the increasing centralist tendencies of the state – 
which are directly opposite to the principles of devolution – continued to add 
to this complexity because the more responsibility that was forced upon the 
ERAs was only matched by their increasing stranglehold on what little 
resources and powers they were likely to receive. Nowhere can this state 
driven complexity be more acutely highlighted than in the Draft Regional 
Assemblies Bill (ODPM, 2004) which had 174 clauses, 13 schedules, and 229 
references to when the Secretary of State would have to be involved. Simply 
put, the scales of balance between policy rhetoric and political reality became 
so unbalanced as to be untenable. 
 What the North East referenda highlighted – and the scale of voter 
apathy showed us – was that the asymmetry of powers and the complexity 
imposed by the state on the ERA proposals resulted in both national and 
regional actors becoming lost in a web on entangled policy hierarchies. The 
arguments purveyed by the pro-regionalist campaigners in the electoral 
campaign reflected this because their arguments were (i) undermined by the 
centralising nature of the state; and (ii) lost in this tangled web of complexity. 
In essence, the scale of voter apathy in the North East referenda (see Section 
1) reflected an electorate who appreciated and identified with the proposals 
for devolution, but who became entirely disillusioned with the complex reality 
that they were presented with. As I have shown throughout this paper, there is 
an historical thread of contradictions that have run through and failed to be 
adequately addressed historically by different waves of English regional 
policy. In the final part of this paper I want to move the debate forward by 
taking three interesting and uniquely different approaches that are being 
debated currently, and asking whether they can address these contradictions. 
Citation: HARRISON, J., 2006. The political-economy of Blair’s “New Regional Policy.” Geoforum, 37 (6), pp. 932-943
 22
 
5.1 For A New Regional Policy? 
After the North East regional referenda, the ODPM Housing, Local 
Government and the Regions Committee (2005: 3) reported that any future 
legislation would need to be ‘more ambitious’ than those presented in order to 
‘create regional bodies that are fit for purpose’. Moreover, the Committee 
(ibid.) stated that: 
 
“The scope of the powers and responsibilities which the Government 
was prepared to give to Assemblies was disappointing and would limit 
their effectiveness. The general power proposed for elected 
assemblies needed to be more explicit with more specific statements of 
their functions. This would provide greater clarity, and could also fire 
the imagination of the general public and potential assembly 
candidates.” 
 
Finally, this Committee believed that “in many key areas where power 
is devolved, central government would have remained the dominant party in 
the relationship with elected regional assemblies” (p20). As this paper has 
noted earlier, this contradiction is critical to our understanding of 
contemporary regionalised policy because while the centre devolves power 
and responsibility with one hand, the other (centralist) hand of government is 
taking powers away from the regions and dragging them back to the centre. It 
is in this contradiction that has led Musson et al (2005) to forward a similar 
reading of events in regard to the existing regional agencies, arguing that 
most analysts writing about the processes of decentralisation have over-
estimated the extent to which the tradition of English centralism was being 
undermined anyway. In what has been colloquially referred to as the ‘Chapter 
2 Agenda’viii, if the power is retained by the state then Government Offices for 
the Regions must be seen as the key institution of governance. Government 
Offices are essentially top-down organisations designed to give central 
government a role in the region, and are subsequently peripheral to the wider 
process of developing and democratising the region. The argument Musson et 
al put forward is essentially premised upon what they would argue is an 
accurate appreciation of (i) the critical role of the state; and, (ii) the asymmetry 
of power which enframe the governance of regional economies. Whilst 
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offering a way forward, this agenda can only be seen as a diluted form of 
devolution in comparison with the ERA proposals. Moreover, the ‘Chapter 2’ 
agenda exhibits the same contradictions as mentioned earlier with regard to 
the RDAs: notably that (i) it treats all regions alike; (ii) there is a shortfall in 
regional democracy; and, (iii) they are simply rescaling political and economic 
activities.  
In 2004, the Labour government launched a new initiative as part of its 
Sustainable Communities Plan (ODPM, 2003) which is designed to cut the 
productivity gap (currently running at £29bn) between the three northern 
regions – the North East, North West, and Yorkshire & the Humber – and the 
rest of the UK. This pan-regional approach known as The Northern Way offers 
a second possible model to move the governance of England’s regions 
forward. Originally, the Northern Way appeared, at least in rhetoric, to 
address the problem of treating all regions alike but subsequently its creation 
has seen a reaction in the remaining regions so that you now have Smart 
Growth: The Midlands Way and The Way Ahead: Delivering Sustainable 
Communities in the South West. At present, this proposal is a significantly 
diluted form of devolution to that mentioned above because it also has a 
shortfall in regional democracy, and is simply a rescaling rather than a 
resolving of political and economic deficits. 
Rather than drawing down powers from London in the form of 
devolution – which it is argued has done little to alter the ‘spatial geometry’ of 
England – Amin et al. (2003) have forwarded a radical proposal which 
disperses state and public institutions in equal shares throughout the nation. 
Whilst this proposal is currently constrained to an imagined reality, in the 
context of this paper, it’s theoretical foundation is very thought-provoking 
because it seeks to remedy the asymmetrical nature of power and 
responsibility which has so bedevilled contemporary institutional 
arrangements for devolution. Moreover, the central tenet of their argument 
has in fact been developed further through the governments Lyons Review 
(2004) which sketched out proposals for the potential of public sector 
relocation throughout Britain. Amin et al. (2003) believe that this type of 
dispersal in state and public institutions, equally throughout the regions, will 
offer a radically new way of imagining the spatiality of the nation with the 
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promise of a multi-nodal rather than hierarchical nation, and a method for 
alleviating both regional economic and political inequality. However, the major 
weakness/contradiction that emerges in both the theoretical (Amin et al., 
2003) and the practical (Lyons, 2004) models is that these proposals are not 
very original. For sure, these proposals merely mark a transition from 
traditional regionalised policies based on the dispersal of finance, to the 
dispersal of people across territory. 
While all three proposals mentioned are at varying stages of their 
development, what I have illustrated through them is that neither the 
arrangements currently, or those developing in the near future, can match the 
political rhetoric of devolution in England. Undoubtedly, the post-ERA future of 
English regionalisation marks a return to an institutional landscape dominated 
by the three underlying contradictions that we have viewed not only through 
the RDAs but also regional policy historically. Furthermore, it marks a return 
to Johnson’s (1983: 6) stable set of propositions that have characterised the 
desire for politics of decentralisation: (i) the concentration of power at the 
centre in the British system of government is harmful and should be reversed; 
(ii) the practices of government are insufficiently democratic; and (iii) the rate 
of economic development has been inadequate and is unequally distributed. 
In England, therefore, it might still be your region, but it’s still their choice. 
 In the final part of this paper, I want to return to my earlier argument 
that there is scope for greater engagement with more grounded thick 
approaches to political economy which seek to blend empirical and theoretical 
propositions and take forward what I would call ‘New Regional Political 
Economy’. While this paper has provided a more grounded thick approach to 
political economy through a reinvigorated political economic reading of the 
state interventionism of Blair’s New Labour government through their 
programme of constitutional change and devolution occurring within Britain, I 
believe that this approach can be extended and many of the arguments that 
have been developed can be explored further. Firstly, that the British 
government has become embroiled in a multiscalar economic and democratic 
conundrum whereby the mixing of academic ideology and policy initiatives, 
juxtaposed alongside the institutional restructuring inherent with the 
modernisation of government, is increasingly leaving the NRP distanciated 
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from new regionalist orthodoxy. Secondly, that this growing chasm between 
the policy rhetoric outlined in the new regionalism and the political reality of 
the measures being deployed on the ground is ostensibly the result of the 
state. Third, contrary to advancing the theoretical notions of civic engagement 
and strategic partnership working for the purposes of instilling trust across 
regional partners, there is a huge asymmetry in power because the British 
state has found itself implementing these democratic ideals solely to enable 
the justification of their economic regionalisation policy. While these 
contradictions are interesting in their own right, I believe that what we are 
looking at here is a much more important political economy reading of 
governance; one that can inform debates surrounding multilevel governance 
and the coordination and embeddedness of policy through scale. As MacLeod 
(2001) institutional approach highlighted it is possible to identify and analyse 
internal co-ordinational struggles within the state through strategies developed 
and implemented by institutions involved in multilevel governance. In 
essence, this paper has sought to offer an opening gamut in a call for more 
grounded thick approaches to political economy; or what I have sought to call 
‘new regional political economy’. 
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i Throughout the remainder of the paper, much of the discussion draws on empirical research 
undertaken between June-August 2003, July-September 2004 and January-April 2005. This 
took the form of semi-structured elite interviews with key stakeholders within the NRP. All 
interviews were fully transcribed and analysed, to inform the arguments contained within this 
paper. 
ii The hurdles were: (i) approval in a regional referendum; (ii) the creation of predominantly 
unitary structures of local government; (iii) parliamentary approval; and, (iv) nil net additional 
cost to the public purse. 
iii Not attempting to implement Straw’s proposed democratic model marked only one of two 
election pledges that the Labour party failed to address in their first term of Office. Labour 
claimed that it was due to an already compressed political timetable, but Hazell (2000) has 
forcefully argued that it was because (i) there was a lack of collective political will; and, (ii) the 
Regional Chambers proposed composition of ‘deadbeat’ local councillors were strongly 
opposed by business. 
iv This opinion comes cross unequivocally in the statement made by John Prescott to the 
House at the announcement of the Building Partnerships for Prosperity White Paper on 3 
December 1997: “As we have made clear in our manifesto, we are committed to moving, with 
the consent of local people, to directly elected regional government in England” (Hansard, 
1997). 
v The economic disparity between the three best- and worst-performing regions in England 
grew by over 30% in Labour’s first term (Huggins, 2001). 
vi Most of the Regional Chambers have now renamed themselves Regional Assemblies but to 
avoid confusion with the directly-elected regional assemblies, throughout the remainder of this 
paper I will continue to call them by their original name to avoid the understandable confusion 
which would arise. 
vii At the original announcement the 3 regions were the North East, North West, and Yorkshire 
& the Humber, but a month later the referendums in the North West and Yorkshire & the 
Humber were postponed indefinitely. 
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viii The ‘Chapter 2 Agenda’ has been coined by key regional stakeholders to explain the 
strengthening of the three regional institutions – RDA, Government Offices, and Regional 
Chambers – as outlined in the Regional White Paper Your Region, Your Choice 
(DTLR/Cabinet Office, 2002). 
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